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Abstract: 
The intervention of digital service providers (DSPs) or platforms such as Spotify, Apple 
Music and Tidal supplying music streamed music has fundamentally altered the operation 
of copyright management organisations (CMOs) and the way that song-writers and 
recording artists are paid.  Platform economics has emerged from the economic analysis of 
two- and multi-sided markets, offering new insights into the way business is conducted in 
the digital sphere and is applied here to music streaming services. The business model for 
music streaming differs from previous arrangements by which the royalty paid to song-
writers and performers was a percentage of sales. In the case of streamed music, payment is 
based on revenues from both subscriptions and ad-based free services. The DSP agrees a 
rate per stream with the various rights holders that varies according to the deal made with 
each of the major record labels, with CMOs, with representatives of independent labels and 
with unsigned artists and songwriters with consequences for artists’ earnings. The article 
discusses these various strands with a view to understanding royalty payments for streamed 
music in terms of platform economics, offering some data and information from the 
Norwegian music industry to give empirical support to the analysis. 
 
 
* Acknowledgement 
This article is produced in association with the University of Oslo research project titled ‘Music on 
Demand: Economy and Copyright in a Digitized Cultural Sector’ and is funded by the Research 
Council of Norway [grant number 271962]. I am grateful for the support of my colleagues on the 
project and to Alan Hui, Christian Handke and an anonymous referee for their detailed comments. 
** Centre for Intellectual Property Policy and Management, Bournemouth University, UK 
 
2 
 
 
Article 
Streamed music has challenged the established economic organization of the music industry. 
For listeners it has made consuming music trivially simple but for those who supply music, 
the chain of production from its composition and performance through to the digital service 
provider (DSP) or platform from which listeners obtain their music, has become complex and 
has distorted payment to those who produce it. For many artists (song-writers and performers) 
streaming has made earning a living from music more difficult. The production process starts 
with contracts between song-writers (and other composers) and music publishers and 
between performers and record labels that deal with the rights accorded them by copyright 
law and ends with platforms that stream music direct to the consumer for a subscription fee or 
for free financed by advertisers. This article traces the economic aspects of the various stages 
of production. 
     Digital distribution of sound recordings via platforms has broken the established royalty 
deals based on sales as streaming has become an increasingly dominant mode of access to 
music: it now constitutes over half of music industry revenues in major markets. Platforms 
(DSPs), which take little part (at least so far) in the business of writing, performing, recording 
and marketing music, some of which do not even specialise in music as part of their wider 
business interests, are hosting music streaming services with business models that differ 
fundamentally from the sales model of CDs and DVDs, with resulting consequences for the 
earnings of the creators and performers in the music industry and for rights management by 
copyright management organisations (CMOs). Moreover, the DSPs have different incentives 
from those of the music industry and adopt different business models – platform pricing – 
which have far-reaching implications for the streaming rates paid to song-writers and 
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performers. This article analyses the supply side of streaming through the lens of platform 
economics and the attendant business models and considers those consequences for payments 
to artists, using the Norwegian music industry, one of the most advanced in terms of the use 
of streamed music, as a case study. 
 
Economic organization and the music industry 
 
Contemporary industrial economics identifies the production and distribution of goods and 
services in terms of a stream of uses of inputs that lead eventually to the output: upstream 
activities in which the content is produced or created and downstream activities as those 
which prepare the product for the market and distribute it. Each stage in the process requires 
sequential contracts between the entrepreneurs involved and, in order to avoid hold-ups that 
could disrupt the production process and lead to losses downstream, they may buy up residual 
rights of upstream producers. Contract theory is now widely adopted in cultural economics to 
explain the structure of the creative industries in these terms along with the trade-off of 
transaction costs inherent in drafting and enforcing contracts (for example, Caves, 2000; 
Towse, 2019).  
     It is obvious from this description that the music industry fits comfortably within this 
framework: upstream musical composition leads on downstream to its performance (live or in 
recording) on to the consumer and then to other users in the secondary markets, such as those 
playing recorded music in public places. As an intangible information good, music has strong 
public goods characteristics of non-rivalry and non-excludability (see Haskell and Westlake 
(2018). While the distribution of music embodied in physical goods (printed music and CDs) 
may be controlled by the seller, intangible goods require intervention in the market to control 
misappropriation by non-payers (piracy), the role which copyright plays in providing 
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statutory protection and an economic incentive to content creation. Copyright law confers 
various rights to protect musical works by upstream creators (song-writers) and further 
downstream, protects rights in performers’ performances and in sound recordings.i  In order 
for creators and performers to reach the market, contracts are made with downstream 
producers in the music industry for the right to use copyright works in production and 
distribution. The deal behind those contracts has implications for the party that controls 
usage, such as streaming. Which rights creators and performers trade or retain upstream have 
downstream consequences for their subsequent earnings from use of their works, including 
streaming. It is these processes in relation to music streaming that are dealt with in this 
article. 
 
The role of copyright 
Song-writers may well be seen in economic terms as upstream entrepreneurs: they invest 
their time, talent and human capital in creating a work which, if successfully exploited and if 
successful on the market, would eventually lead to payment based on that success, depending 
on the contract with downstream users (often in the first place a publisher). Contracts are 
complex and attempt to cope with every potential use, though they are never complete (see 
Caves, 2000). The type of contract determines which party has decision rights over the use of 
their work. Publishing contracts for music and lyrics take various forms ranging from an 
administration deal (in which the author retains the copyright while licensing reproduction 
and other such rights), a single song assignment (the publisher obtains the rights in exchange 
for an agreed royalty) or an exclusive publishing agreement, which may cover a specific 
number of songs over a period of time and require the assignment of all rights to each song 
(Harrison, 2011; Towse, 2017). Where there is an assignment of rights, the publisher would 
typically pay an advance to be recouped from future royalties (which is not repayable by the 
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author if royalties are insufficient). With rights assigned to the publisher, the song writer’s 
royalties from streaming depend on the arrangement made by the publisher with the DSP via 
the CMOs that licence mechanical and performing rights.   
     For the last hundred years or so CMOs have acted on behalf of their members to collect 
and distribute copyright royalty and other statutory payments, making deals on rates with user 
organisations and enforcing them, including when necessary in court. The CMO negotiates 
rates for use of copyright material in secondary markets, for example, broadcasting. Revenues 
from streaming due to song-writers and are distributed by the appropriate CMO, which holds 
details of the mandated share to the revenue handed over to them by the streaming service in 
in accordance with the mandates agreed in the various underlying contracts. 
     Music mostly requires performance to elicit payment and music publishers (and 
independent song-writers without a publishing contract) deal with record labels and producers 
of live performances to promote the work of their clients; though many song-writers are also 
performers performing their own songs, it is important to distinguish the two activities for 
copyright purposes as rights differ and are managed by different CMOs. Others, such as 
music managers and record producers, involved in the initial production may also have a 
share of revenues but they are ignored here for want of space (see Riches, 2017) for a detailed 
exposition. The publishing contract enables the publisher to negotiate the deal with a record 
label and to register the work with a CMO for administering the performing rights (usually 
shared 50:50 between publisher and song writer(s) and the mechanical rights. There may be 
several, even many, persons involved in the creative process who may or may not have a 
formal contract allocating their share of royalties between them, leading to later disputes. 
Performers have rights in their performances, though in the recording contract with the record 
label, they mostly sign away all rights in a royalty deal, often with an advance to cover costs 
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of making the recording. The record label argues that is necessary for it to be able to fully 
exploit the recording and thus it is the party that deals with the DSP.   
     By the end of this process (which is only briefly sketched here), song-writers, performers, 
publishers and record labels have shares as agreed in their respective contracts of the value 
created by the various uses of the recording, including streaming. Pre-streaming contracts 
(and reportedly many post-streaming contracts) do not make formal provision for the division 
of streaming royalties, however (see Cooke, 2018). 
 
Platform economics and streaming services 
 
Platform economics is a term used in industrial economics to analyse activities of enterprises 
that distribute products online, such as streamed music. A platform coordinates distinct 
groups of participants in two or more markets by offering a virtual ‘marketplace’ on which 
they can trade. The term platform economics has become established for the analysis of the 
various types of enterprises, mostly online intermediaries, which act as distribution channels 
for goods and services produced by others (that is, production and distribution are split up, 
often a key feature in the digital economy). Online business models are enabled by the 
freedom from engagement in production on the one hand and, on the other hand, are 
empowered by the vast amounts of data that are harvested from consumers’ online behaviour 
involved in all kinds of activities, not just those relating to the purchase of music – so-called 
datafication (Ezrachi and Stucke, 2016).  
     Crucial to these business models are network effects. Network effects arise on platforms 
in two ways: direct effects within a group of users (producers or consumers) when users 
benefit from the number of users on their side of the market; and indirect cross-group effects 
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when users benefit from the number on the other side of the market (for instance, advertisers 
benefit from the number of viewers). In fact, the analysis of platforms has caused economists 
to recognise some older enterprises - credit card companies, dating agencies and some kinds 
of department stores - as platforms, along with commercial broadcasters and newspapers 
which have long been regarded as operating two-sided markets. The aim of the platform is to 
set prices so as to maximise its profits over all its activities, thus causing the price on one side 
to depend on the price(s) on the other side(s).  
     A platform also creates network effects by offering its own additional services, for 
example, ratings and recommendations systems to steer consumers towards complementary 
goods and hosting applications created by others.ii These activities generate data that are 
commercially valuable to the platform; for example, Netflix has used data on audience 
preferences to predict the success of certain film and TV programme genres and applied the 
information in the production of its own products, a route that could be taken by music 
streaming services in the future. Data acquired on one platform is also valuable to other 
enterprises, to which platforms may sell their data. 
     Streaming services are platforms; they acquire rights from record labels to distribute 
recorded music online or to mobile devices, which they make available to consumers 
(listeners) either by selling a subscription (the price for time limited rental) or providing it for 
free to listeners via an ad-based service financed by the sale of time-based slots to advertisers 
on the other side of the market. A DSP for which streaming music is its sole activity, for 
instance, Spotify, is a two-sided market with prices on one side for listeners and those on the 
other side for advertisers. Other DSPs, such as Apple, are multi-sided platforms supplying 
several types of services, for each of which there is a price. A question addressed later is 
whether competition between music streaming services is affected by the structure of the 
DSP market, that is, two-sided versus multi-sided platforms. 
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     The analysis presented here provides the background for applying economics to music 
streaming with the emphasis on the generation and distribution of revenues to song-writers 
and performers. In the streaming market, the upstream price is negotiated by the DSP for the 
rights to stream the music and the downstream price is a subscription fee (or zero price for 
ad-based users of the service) and for ad-based services, the price charged to the advertiser. It 
is an obvious application of platform economics. 
 
DSPs, competition and pricing of streamed music services  
 
Competition and prices are linked: in general, the greater the extent of competition in a 
market, the greater the downward pressure on prices. For DSPs, however, the relationship is 
more complex due to two- and multi-sided business models (Hagiu, 2012).   
 
Competition between streaming platforms 
 
Streamed music is supplied directly to end users by competing DSPs. DSPs contract with the 
major record companies (Universal Music, Sony and Warner Music) and with bodies 
representing independent labels for licences to stream music. Payment is made to the record 
label which in turn distributes it to contracted performers, in principle in accordance with 
their contracts. The DSPs provide some (but reportedly inadequate) data on usage and there is 
controversy over the amount and manner of these distributions over and above the issue of 
the streaming rates paid www.digitaltrends.com/music/apple-music-vs-spotify/ ). A 
prominent example is that of Eminem’s songs: his publisher, Eight Mile claims that Spotify 
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does not have the requisite permissions for streaming his work and is suing for copyright 
infringement (see The Hollywood Reporter, 2019). 
     Platforms compete through pricing and non-price means. As the price on one side of the 
platform influences demand on both sides through cross-group network effects, the platform 
may run one side at a loss in order to compete with its rivals on a particular market (though 
that may be illegal in some jurisdictions). By attracting consumers to the loss-leading side 
through very low prices, the platform makes its service valuable for the other (profit-making) 
sides and ensures their participation (Bourreau and Bacache, 2020). This suggests that multi-
sided platforms have a competitive edge over two-sided platforms as they can support greater 
losses on the loss-making side. Thus Apple Music (part of a multi-sided DSP) has caught up 
with Spotify (a two-sided DSP) in the USA, though Spotify still dominates other markets 
(www.digitaltrends.com/music/apple-music-vs-spotify/). That said, there seems to be little 
competition in terms of the price of the subscription fee (see Table 1 in the Appendix). 
      In terms of non-price competition, DSPs compete by the range of additional services they 
offer in addition to the catalogue. Catalogue sizes and genre range vary between platforms 
but as the major record labels have made non-exclusive deals with streaming platforms, they 
each offer a very similar portfolio. Differences arise particularly in relation to indie 
catalogues and other non-economic features: for instance, one would expect, Norway to have 
different catalogue preferences based on language and, of course, advertisements would 
specifically target Norwegian consumers.  
 
Single and multi-homing 
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A ‘natural’ brake on the market power of a DSP is provided by consumers’ choice to use 
more than one platform; opting for a single ‘home’ reduces search and other transaction costs 
but opens them up to potential exploitation from a monopoly, while ‘multi-homing’ incurs 
higher costs of time and attention but increases choice and may reduce the prices they pay 
(Belleflamme and Peitz, 2019). Platforms try to capture (‘lock-in’) consumers through 
subscriptions that last a fixed period of time but they also offer free trials to entice them away 
from competitors. The type of streaming agreements, for example, for families and free 
introductory offers impact on the amounts paid to song-writers and performers. 
     Rights holders may also choose between giving exclusive rights to a DSP (single home) or 
to several or all (multi-home), thereby also influencing the market power of the streaming 
service. 
 
Platform pricing 
Platforms set prices on the different sides of the market according to users’ willingness to 
pay: with market power, it can price discriminate, including supplying some services for free, 
taking advantage of consumers’ differing valuations and responsiveness to price, while 
marginal costs of supplying any number of consumers are effectively zero. Platforms are able 
to estimate an individual’s willingness to pay based on data it acquires from users’ previous 
sales or the profile of their characteristics (gender, age, interests and the rest) obtained from 
their own or other data sources. Perfect (first degree) price discrimination, which elicits the 
maximum revenues from consumers, is possible as well as dynamic pricing sensitive to the 
interaction between supply and demand with the use of AI (Artificial Intelligence) settings, 
now widely adopted by platforms. As a degree of monopoly is needed for price 
discrimination to work, it attracts the attention of competition authorities, which regulate 
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monopolistic practices, though dynamic pricing may be covert and evade scrutiny (see 
Ezrachi and Stucke, 2016, on the use of AI for dynamic pricing). 
 
Subscription fees for consumers 
Starting at the downstream end, Table 1 shows monthly subscription rates to individual users 
of leading DSPs and the number of subscribers to the leading music streaming services. 
There is almost no price competition for individual subscription rates.  
     User numbers have been growing for all except Tidal: Apple Music had just overtaken 
Spotify in the US in terms of the number of subscribers at the time of writing. While 
subscriptions may grow, though, their rate of growth is slowing down. Some countries, 
especially those in Scandinavia, have a very high percentage of paid subscriptions as a 
proportion of total revenue by international standards raising the question of how much 
further growth is possible: is the paid subscription market saturated? If so, the only means of 
increasing upstream payments would be to increase subscription fees and/or advertising rates; 
for instance, Spotify was due to increase the family subscription rate by 13 per cent at the 
time of writing (www.digitalmusicnews.com/2019/08/15/spotify-price-hike). Given the 
competition between streaming services, some two-sided and others multi-sided platforms, it 
not a simple equation. A DSP raising the subscription charge could cause consumers to 
switch to another service thus lowering revenue; that would then have to be made up by more 
revenue from advertisers, since advertising revenue ‘cross subsidises’ subscribers. If 
subscribers switch to an ad-funded streaming service, however, advertisers would switch too 
as they seek more listeners to their ads. It is becoming evident that two-sided platforms that 
specialise in one product, as Spotify does in music, are in a relatively weaker competitive 
position in the streaming market in contrast to multi-sided platforms which can cross-
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subsidise music streaming with revenues from other products and sources. These issues have 
implications for song-writers’ and artists’ earnings and are the manifestation of platform 
economics.  
 
Streaming rates to record labels  
Moving upstream, Table 2 shows the considerable variation in the rates payable to the major 
record labels in the streaming market in the USA in 2019, as reported by Digital Music News. 
The report also provides data on changes within each year, showing that this is not a stable 
market in terms of pricing. Indeed, several of the music streaming services reported losses: 
Spotify, for instance, has so far not made a profit. As argued above, those which are part of 
multi-sided platforms, such as Apple Music and Amazon, may have more secure ‘internal’ 
finance and accordingly be able to offer higher rates to record labels. They benefit from both 
direct and indirect network effects as well as from scalability and synergies and economies of 
scope (Haskel and Westlake, 2018). On the last point, at the time of writing, Apple was 
negotiating with the record labels with the aim of offering a combined Video and Music 
service. 
 
Advertising rates 
The other upstream element in a two-sided market is the rate paid by advertisers. On 
Spotify’s Premium ad-based services advertisements last up to 30 seconds and are played 
every 15 minutes between songs; there are options for branded and sponsored playlists with 
logos and scrolling through to the advertiser’s site. The minimum charge is $25,000 per 
campaign, with cost per minute ranging from $5–$30, and a service for small businesses; for 
individual adverts using the Spotify Ad Studio, the minimum Spotify advertising budget is 
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$250 (www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/12/25/streaming-music-services-pay-2019/).  
Income from advertising forms part of the pot from which payment is made to artists. 
 
Streaming rates and artists 
 
Taking all this as a whole, the above data provide a basis from which to discuss the important 
question of how and how much song-writers and performers earn from streaming. Table 4 is 
based on an interesting calculation made by Digital Music News of the total plays needed to 
earn the US Minimum Monthly Wage in 2019. It cannot make encouraging reading for the 
majority of recording artists. By contrast, Digital News reported that in 2017 the ‘big three’ – 
Universal, Sony and Warner - made an estimated $14.2 million a day from streaming services 
such as Spotify and Apple Music with the Universal Music Group alone making $4.5 million 
each day.iii 
     Streaming revenue depends both sides of the market: subscriptions and fees from 
advertisers. As markets are international, revenues are also influenced by other factors such 
as variations in currency rates in the consumer’s domicile and in national copyright law. How 
much is passed on to song-writers and recording artists, however, depends on the type of 
contract and the royalty rate they have agreed with the publisher and/or the record label and 
whether payment is managed by the CMOs or dealt with individually.  
 
Streaming and copyright  
Changes to copyright law have not been helpful to performers (Taylor and Towse, 1998), 
though the recent changes made to deal with online activity were supposed to favour them. 
The so-called Internet Treaties established by the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
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(WIPO) the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performers and Phonograms 
Treaty (WPPT), which have been adopted throughout Europe and elsewhere, mandated the 
so-called ‘making available’ right for authors and performers respectively, which relates to 
any use for which the consumer can choose the time of access as with streamed music 
(Towse, 2005). Apart from the issue whether publishing and performers’ contracts explicitly 
include this right, there is disquiet regarding its efficacy. The right is an individual one and, 
though mostly contracted to a publisher or record label, it may be exercised independently, 
usually via a CMO or other monitoring agent.  
 
Implications for the regulation of CMOs in the music industry 
 
CMOs act on behalf of rights holders to set royalty rates for usage and to collect and enforce 
payments by users. In most countries, they are regulated in one way or another by the state 
due to their monopoly power:  in some (for example, in the USA and Canada), there are 
Copyright Courts or Boards that set rates for specific rights and uses; other arrangements 
involve the Ministry of Justice or a Copyright Tribunal to which conflicts may be referred. 
Platform economics is making the operation of these regulators more complex as it is not 
simply the rate charged to the user or the administration charge that has to be taken into 
account but more complex pricing in two-and multi-sided markets. 
     One might ask whether the CMOs are themselves platforms (Handke, 2014). A CMO 
bundles together a specific right or group of rights to many works by many authors and sets 
prices with the many diverse users. It then distributes its net revenues to its members. With 
rights assigned to the CMO, it obtains the exclusive mandate to act on behalf of the right 
owner and therefore may be seen as a reseller platform. Not all CMOs require assignment of 
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rights or exclusivity, though, and moreover, streaming and adjustments to copyright law 
(such as the making available right) have disrupted established operations of CMOs. Thus, as 
has been argued in the economics literature, the assignation of ‘platform’ to CMOs has to 
depend on the institutional arrangements and attendant business model. 
     The rights relevant to streaming are the mechanical and performing rights of the song-
writer and the making available right and the performance right of the performer. Music 
streaming services therefore require licences for two sets of rights mandated by copyright 
law: from the song-writer for the mechanical rights for reproduction and distribution of a 
recorded track of copyright music and for the performing right for its public performance on 
the one hand, and from the performer for the right to use their performance on the other. For 
contracted song-writers, the publisher and the songwriter share the performing right royalty; 
otherwise the unsigned song-writer gets the whole payment (minus the administrative charge 
of the CMO). (In addition, a synchronisation licence is also needed for music in a video; 
synch rights payments are not considered here, however). Performers get the percentage 
agreed with record label, though a bone of contention is whether or not labels are exempted 
from paying performer equitable remuneration for streamed music, potentially reducing 
performers’ income from that source (Cooke, 2018). 
     The outcome is that there is competition for the ‘digital dollar’ between the various rights 
holders and their representatives, as noted in a recent US Copyright Board decision in 
relation to the appeal by Spotify; in the USA, the Copyright Royalty Board sets the rates for 
mechanical licences (see www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/spotifys-copyright-
royalty-board-appeal-decoded).  
 
How the money reaches the artist 
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How does the money from streaming reach the artist? Few artists, if any, have individually-
tailored deals with a streaming service – transaction costs would be too high. Instead there is 
a structure of deals and arrangements that eventually transfer the monies collected from plays 
on streaming services to the creators, which differs as between song-writers, signed and 
unsigned performers and backing performers. 
 
Song-writers 
 
Song-writers initially own all rights in the copyright of their works: not all songs are 
published but for those that are, the song-writer may opt for one of several types of 
publishing contracts, ranging from full assignment of all rights of a bundle of works for a 
period of time (often the full copyright term) to a non-exclusive administration contract for 
one or more songs. Of course, many songs are written by those who perform them and that 
could mean that the copyright in them is handled by the record label in a so-called 360 degree 
contract (which also includes live performance fees, sales of any memorabilia, branded goods 
and so on). There are specific organizations dealing with digital publishing rights, for 
example, IMPEL (Independent Music Publishers’ E-Licensing) Collective Management Ltd 
is the collective licensing agency representing digital publishing rights; it is owned and 
controlled by its independent publisher members.  
     Whichever contractual arrangement is made, when a song is recorded the record label 
contracts with the publisher or with the song-writer for permission to record and distribute it. 
The publisher and /or song-writer join the relevant CMO for the public performance of the 
song (live or recorded) and for the mechanical right. Evidence on song-writers’ earnings from 
streaming, is hard to come by, however. Some performing rights CMOs make data available 
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on the distribution of their revenues according to various income brackets; those data in the 
past have shown that more than half the membership fails to earn the minimum amount 
eligible for distribution (Taylor and Towse, 1998; Towse, 2017).  
 
 
Signed recording artists 
 
 
For ‘signed’ performers, the contract is likely to transfer all rights to the label in exchange for 
a percentage royalty payment. The record label therefore holds the rights and makes the deal 
with the streaming service. The artist is then paid according to the contract that is made with 
the label. The contract may or may not specify the share (if any) of the streaming revenue due 
to the artist(s). That is one of the ‘transparency’ issues the EU has emphasized in this context 
(see Osbourne, 2019). 
     Deals between DSPs and the majors are made individually or with Merlin, the global 
digital rights collection agency for the independent label sector. In 2019, Merlin paid over 
$2bn to its members, who represent thousands of independent labels and distributors; it 
licensed more than 25 DSPs on a global basis. In 2019, 54 per cent of Merlin members 
reported that digital income accounted for more than 75 per cent of their overall business 
revenues (www.merlinnetwork.org/news/post/merlin-reveals-record-revenue-distributions-in-
new-2019-membership-report), 
 
Unsigned artists 
 
 
Independent artists offer their recordings on their own websites and via YouTube, Spotify for 
Artists, Apple Music of Artists, Google Play or other hosts. Spotify for Artists has an artist 
verification scheme, which operates via their preferred artist distributors 
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(https://artists.spotify.com/faq/popular#how-do-i-submit-music-to-your-editorial-team). 
Spotify for Artists takes 30 per cent of revenue and distributes the remaining 70 per cent as 
royalties to the publishers, who then pay artists according to their agreements 
(www.openmicuk.co.uk/advice/how-to-make-money-in-the-music-industry/ ).  
 
Backing performers 
 
Little has changed with streaming for backing artists (sessions musicians) as they typically 
work for a flat fee that buys out the rights in their performances. In the EU, they now have 
the right to further payment fifty years after the publication of a sound recording: session 
musicians are entitled to an equal share of 20 per cent of gross revenues from physical and 
online sales of the recording via the performers’ rights CMO. The legislation states that a 
musician cannot waive the right to this income 
(www.musiciansunion.org.uk/Home/Advice/Recording-Broadcasting/Copyright-and-
Performers-Rights-FAQs).  
     Overall, the growth of streaming has raised the question whether it has increased revenues 
for song-writers, music publishers, performers and record labels or simply replaced one 
source of revenue with another, so-called ‘cannibalisation’. Using Spotify data for 2013-15, 
Waldfogel and Aguiar (2015) found that Spotify use had displaced downloads and sales but, 
on the other hand, it had sufficiently stemmed piracy so that overall losses of revenue from 
sales were roughly outweighed by new income from streaming (see also Waldfogel, 2018). 
 
Streaming and the CMOs 
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Streaming does not easily fit with the traditional blanket licence business model of the CMOs 
in music, whereby the CMO negotiates fees and arranges licensing with a host of varied users 
from broadcasters to hairdressers then distributes the revenues to its members at the same rate 
according to the quantitative use made of their work (Handke and Towse, 2007). For uses 
such as TV and radio, for example, CMOs have blanket licence contracts and standardized 
rates with TV and radio stations; in the UK, in fact, the BBC continues to work that way with 
the PRS (Performing Right Society) and PPL (Phonographic Performance Ltd) for digital 
usage.  
     One of the main challenges of collecting income from streamed music is the huge number 
of transactions that have to be dealt with. Streamed music may require different 
administration (for example, for individual and direct licensing) within a territory and for 
multi-territorial cross-border licensing and business models of advertiser-financed services 
pose further challenges. CMOs have had to invest in new data management systems to adjust 
to these changes so that they are able to collect and distribute revenues more quickly and 
accurately. Moreover, national CMOs in the EU have been instructed by its ‘Collecting 
Society Directive’ to offer digital management services of equal standard throughout the EU, 
requiring those that cannot do so to make arrangements with a CMO that can; this has 
introduced a measure of competition into an arena in which non-profit membership 
organisations operated collectively and in which there was previously collaboration rather 
than competition. iv  
     I have argued that the requirements of the Collecting Society Directive necessarily favour 
the larger CMOs, that is, those that can invest most in data systems are able to produce the 
highest standard of service and, as CMOs are in economic terms natural monopolies, there is 
an underlying tendency for the bigger ones to dominate the ‘market’ for digital musical rights 
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management services (Towse, 2012, 2013). The reason is that the greater the number of titles 
and the more members there are over which the fixed (sunk) costs of a very large investment 
in computer capability can be spread (scalability), the lower are the administrative costs 
charged to right holders and therefore the more competitive is the larger CMO. As a result, 
those wealthy enough to make the investment are likely to attract more members and 
mandates and, as a consequence, spread fixed costs even further. As members upload their 
own data, more members may be added at almost no extra (marginal) cost to the CMO. The 
bigger the CMO, the bigger it will become – the logic of the intangible world (Haskel and 
Westlake, 2016; Ezrachi and Stucke (2016). The UK’s PRS for Music is one of the larger 
music CMOs in Europe and is part of the ICE (International Copyright Enterprise, see 
www.iceservices.com/company/what-is-ice/) formed with the Swedish and German 
performing rights CMOs, STIM and GEMA.v   In the digital world in which scale and scope 
matters it is difficult for smaller national CMOs to compete, however. 
 
Does streaming need CMOs? 
 
CMOs are typically monopolies for the specific rights they administer. In economic terms 
they are natural monopolies (as are most network industries, in which competition is less 
efficient due to higher unit costs) and as such are subject to regulation by the state (Tirole, 
2016). As noted earlier, CMOs traditionally required assignment of rights. Enabled by digital 
collection of data and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to analyse it (Big Data and Big 
Analytics), other agents have entered this market; a notable example is Kobalt, which acts on 
behalf of the songwriter to monitor the use of their music and distribute the payment without 
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requiring any assignment of rights. They offer only digital services and so do not have to 
have the wider administrative apparatus of the long established CMOs which includes some 
uses (for example, live concerts) that have much higher administration costs. Established 
CMOs therefore face cream-skimming from new entrants dealing only with streamed music, 
a topic that merits further research. 
      Overall, the question that concerns the music industry is whether subscription services are 
able to grow replacing ‘free’ or freemium services. It is a significant matter for those 
territories in which streaming was adopted early; a prominent case in point is Norway 
(discussed below) where almost ninety per cent of the population stream music. Another 
source of concern about streaming is that user upload content (UUC) services such as 
YouTube, which have large advertising revenues, pay only a tiny fraction to creators and 
significantly less than other streaming services such as Spotify and Apple Music (see Tables 
2 and 3). The differential (often referred to as the ‘value gap’) impedes competition   
(Liebowitz, 2018). Usage figures bear out this point for Norway (Polaris, 2018). 
 
Data profile of streaming the Norwegian music industry 
 
The Norwegian music industry offers an interesting case study of the economics of 
streaming. Norway (population 5.4 million) is one of the wealthiest countries worldwide; it 
has very high internet coverage with very high levels of daily usage (91 per cent of 
individuals in 2018: see www.statista.com/topics/4258/media-usage-in-norway/). Norway has 
a vibrant domestic market for music, which is strongly supported by state subsidies in various 
ways, including grants to early career artists. It has a growing international market which is 
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also supported by state funding and institutional arrangements. These economic aspects have 
to be taken into account in understanding its music industry and the role of streaming. 
     In the context of the international music industry, the CISAC 2018 Global Collections 
Report, which presents internationally comparative data per capita reported that CMO 
revenue from music licensing in Norway was 12.5 euros per head of population (compared, 
for instance, to 10.2 euros in the UK, which has a much bigger market). There are limitations 
to making such comparisons as they may be biased by the way that exchange rates are 
calculated and also fail to reflect the underlying differences in cultural consumption and 
institutional arrangements.  
     According to Arts Council Norway, music industry revenue was 4,889 m. NOK (roughly 
500 million euros) in 2017, of which domestic revenue represented 93 percent; ‘copyright 
revenue’ constituted 22 percent of domestic revenues. In terms of consumption patterns, a 
2019 Polaris Norway survey on music consumption patterns showed that:  
• 21per cent downloaded music and 15 per cent purchased CDs.  
• 88 per cent streamed music: 50 per cent with a paid subscription; 38 per cent on a free 
service 
• 69 per cent listened on YouTube; 58 per cent on Spotify; 25 per cent on Facebook; 15 
per cent on iTunes; 11per cent on Instagram. 
      
     The 2019 BI report What Now (Hva Nå) (BI, 2019) provides data on the changing pattern 
of the Norwegian music industry from 2011-2017 in terms of turnover, which grew by 
approximately 50 per cent over the period. Streamed music services grew from 5 to14 per 
cent of the total over the period, while physical sales fell from 10 to 9 percent. At the same 
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time, the share of composers and performers fell from 29 to 24 per cent. Concert turnover 
rose from 29 to 33 percent, representing the largest single item of the total. Indexed growth of 
streaming services was 367 percent between 2011 and 2017; it was also projected to rise with 
Spotify, the dominant DSP, increasing its turnover, though at a lower rate of growth than 
before. Turnover data run the danger of double-counting, however, and do not take inflation 
into account, which varied from 0.7 to 3.6 percent over the period; even taking that into 
account, though, it is clear that revenue from streamed music had grown. Nevertheless, there 
is concern that the rate of growth is slowing down, something that is reported in other 
developed markets (www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/the-major-labels-are-now-close-to-
generating-1m-from-streaming-every-hour-but-global-growth-is-actually-slowing-down/). 
     Two CMOs are involved in licensing music and distributing revenues: TONO manages 
performing rights and also mechanical rights for Norwegian song-writers on behalf of the 
Nordic Copyright Bureau, which deals with mechanical rights (including synchronisation) for 
melody and lyrics in sound recordings in various media (including streaming) for all the 
Nordic countries; Gramo administers the economic rights of performers and record 
companies. In 2017, TONO distributed NOK 565 m. (around 57 million euros); online use 
contributed 23 per cent to the turnover while GRAMO distributed NOK 58.7 million (around 
6 million euros) to performers (of which 27 percent was to foreign performers). These data 
offer an insight into the music business in a relatively small national market in a highly 
developed economy; they are indicative of future trends elsewhere.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has dealt mostly with the supply side of streamed music: other insights may come 
from fuller analysis of the demand side, represented here by data showing that the market 
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produces uniform prices and more or less the same service for users in terms of catalogue. 
Economics of contracting provides insight into the organization of the production of recorded 
music and the economics of platforms does the same for music streaming. Platform 
economics goes a long way to unravel the structure of incentives and payments to both sides 
of these two- and multi-sided markets. Taken together, the analysis goes some way to 
understanding the processes leading to the distribution of incomes to song-writers and 
performers from streamed music. 
     From being regarded initially as the cuckoo on the nest of the recording industry, 
streaming is hailed as the solution to revenue losses from piracy and falling CD sales and the 
majors are now benefitting from significant payments from DSPs. The multiplicity of the 
underlying deals for streamed music and the mixture of individual and collective 
arrangements is confusing, however, and has led to considerable dissatisfaction on the part of 
song-writers and performers as well as of legal scholars and policy-makers.  
     Streaming has disrupted the process of payments to creators and performers. Due to the 
underlying contractual arrangements, signed artists have less control over the earnings from 
their performances than song-writers, whose CMOs make the deals. The creation of the 
making available right as an individual right (rather than a collective right entitling 
performers to equitable remuneration) has if anything reduced payments to performers. 
Evidence has long shown the relatively low earnings from copyright for the typical song-
writer and performer: there is a middle rank of those who can sustain a modest living from 
recording along with other paying activities but only the superstars truly benefit. Streaming 
rates are too low to fully sustain a full-time career as a recording artist for the majority.  
     The situation in Norway, where subscription levels and fees for streamed music are 
already high, raises the question whether a one hundred per cent subscription market with no 
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advertising could sustain the current level of activity and the output of new work in the music 
industry. The record industry in Norway faces effective competition from concerts and 
festivals, though royalties from live performance are only around 20 per cent of total 
copyright income. In order to increase royalty income from concerts, fees to artists would 
have to rise, pushing up the price of concert tickets (or be financed by advertisers?). That 
raised the question to what extent can the music industry depend on the market or is long 
term subsidy needed? These are issues that participants in many other national music 
industries face. 
     The analysis in this article raises the fundamental question: how sustainable is streaming 
as a long term business model for the music industry in terms of creating new work in a 
viable music market? The Spotify two-sided model faces competition from multi-sided 
platforms, notably Apple, which can cross-subsidize from their other activities. In addition to 
‘traditional’ economies of scale and scope, they are able to internalise benefits from network 
effects, spill-overs and synergies that can be captured within the corporate enterprise.  It is 
hard to see how Spotify, for example, which has yet to turn in a profit, can compete in the 
long run. The music industry therefore could be swallowed up in a multi-product corporation, 
presumably losing its identity and maybe any vestigial claim to creativity. True to its image 
as the dismal science, the economics of streaming does not suggest a rosy future for the 
music industry. 
 
Appendix 
Table 1 Streaming services monthly subscription rates (£), library size and users: 2019 
DSP   subscription*  library users** 
Spotify   9.99   35m. 100m. 
Apple Music  9.99   45m. 50m. 
Tidal Premium***  9.99   50m.   3m. 
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Tidal HiFi   19.99   50m.    ? 
YouTube Music  9.99   50k. 15m. 
Amazon: Unlimited and Prime Music 9.99 7.99 for    35m. 
    Prime members   
* per individual       
** not all subscribers      
*** includes exclusives by JayZ, Beyonce, Kanye West et 
al.    
 
Sources: www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/0/best-music-streaming-services-apple-music-spotify-
amazon-music/Accessed 01/12-19. 
Notes: Spotify and Deezer offer a freemium ad-supported service (for which the number of users is 
not included here). The rate is quoted in UK pounds sterling (rates are the same in US dollars and in 
Euros, however). 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 2 Rates per Stream to Major Labels, 2019: USD  
DSP                                        
Spotify  0.00437                    
Apple iTunes/Apple 
Music 0.00735                  
Google  0.00676                   
Amazon  0.00402                  
Deezer  0.0064                      
Tidal   0.0125                     
YouTube                             0.00069                 
 
 
Source:www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/12/25/streaming-
music-services-pay-2019/ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3 Streaming rates to unsigned artists in 2017 
Spotify                  $0.0038 
Apple Music         $0.0064 
Tidal                     $0.0110 
Deezer                  $0.0056 
YouTube              $0.0006 
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Source: https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/01/16/streaming-music-services-pay-2018/ 
 
 
Table 4. Total Plays Needed to Earn US Minimum Monthly Wage: 2019 
       
DSP  Stream rate No. of plays needed  
       
TIDAL                0.0125   177,604  
Apple Music 0.00735   200,272  
Spotify  0.00437   336,842  
Amazon  0.00402   366,169  
YouTube  0.00069   2,133,333  
       
Source: www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/12/25/streaming-music-
services-pay-2019/ 
 
      
       
 
End notes 
 
i) For full details of these rights in music, see Going for a Song, a short comic-
format video which also provides carefully prepared information on musical rights 
and how they are managed www.copyrightuser.org/create/creative-process/going-
for-a-song/ Accessed 06/12/19. 
 
ii) See Belleflamme and Peitz www.ipdigit.eu/2018/10/reviews-ratings-and-
recommendations-the-3-rs-that-make-digital-platforms-engine-roar/, accessed 
04/12/19.  Bourreau and Gaudin (2018) have shown that the use of a 
recommendation system that steers listeners towards lower-priced content enables 
the platform to reduce its royalty payments to copyright holders. 
 
iii) www.digitalmusicnews.com/2017/07/24/what-streaming-music-services-pay-
updated-for-2017/.  Some analogous data is provided by PRS for the UK for 
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different outlets – see www.openmicuk.co.uk/advice/why-singers-should-join-the-
prs-performing-rights-society/. Both accessed 04/12/19.  
 
iv) Directive 2014/26 EU on Collective Management of Copyright and Related 
Rights and Multi-Territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical Works for Online Use 
in the Internal Market. For a commentary on the Directive see 
http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/30489/1/Lodder%2C%20Murray-
Regulation_of_E-commerce_15_Chapter10%20Mendis.pdf  accessed 04/12/19. 
There are other challenges, such as the trade-off between efficiency of distribution 
versus equity within the CMO, dealt with in detail by Page and Safir (2018). 
 
v) STIM is the Swedish copyright management organization form music creators and 
publishers; GEMA (Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische 
Vervielfältigungsrechte) is the equivalent organization in Germany. 
PRS for Music itself processed 6.6 trillion uses in 2017; in 2019 it licensed 25 
million works on behalf of its 140,000 UK members who assign their rights to it 
with an administrative charge of 12.5 per cent. Its revenue was £1 billion in 2019, 
with International representing 36%, Public Performance 28%, Broadcast 19% 
and Online, 17%. Online had grown by 53 percent since 2016 
(www.prsformusic.com/what-we-do/who-we-work-with/ice). The CISAC 2019 
Global Collections Report showed that digital music revenues had grown by over 
28 per cent (www.cisac.org). 
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